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Introduction 
Engineering assets such as roads, rail, bridges and other forms of public works are vital to the effective functioning 
of societies (Herder and Verwater-Lukso 2006). Proficient provision of this physical infrastructure is therefore one 
of the key activities of government (Lædre et al. 2006). In order to ensure engineering assets are procured and 
maintained on behalf of citizens, government needs to devise the appropriate policy and institutional architecture 
for this purpose. The changing institutional arrangements around the procurement of engineering assets are the 
focus of this paper. 
 
The paper describes and analyses the transition to new, more collaborative forms of procurement arrangements 
which are becoming increasingly prevalent in Australia and other OECD countries. Such fundamental shifts from 
competitive to more collaborative approaches to project governance can be viewed as a major transition in 
procurement system arrangements. In many ways such changes mirror the shift from New Public Management, 
with its emphasis on the use of market mechanisms to achieve efficiencies (Hood 1991), towards more 
collaborative approaches to service delivery, such as those under network governance arrangements (Keast 
,Brown and Mandell 2007). However, just as traditional forms of procurement in a market context resulted in 
unexpected outcomes for industry, such as a fragmented industry afflicted by chronic litigation (Dubois and Gadde 
2002), the change to more collaborative forms of procurement is unlikely to be a panacea to the problems of 
procurement, and may well also have unintended consequences.  
 
This paper argues that perspectives from complex adaptive systems (CAS) theory can contribute to the theory and 
practice of managing system transitions. In particular the concept of emergence provides a key theoretical 
construct to understand the aggregate effect that individual project governance arrangements can have upon the 
structure of specific industries, which in turn impact individual projects. Emergence is understood here as the 
macro structure that emerges out of the interaction of agents in the system (Holland 1998; Tang and Youmin 
2006).  
 
CAS theory holds that multiple interactions between agents result in structural changes of the system at an 
aggregate level (Dubois and Gadde 2002, 630). It is this area of evolution and emergence which CAS theory is 
held to provide a powerful extension to the advances already made by transition theory (Loorbach and van Raak 
2005; Kemp and Rotmans 2001).   
 
Klijn and Teisman (2007) argued recently that the governance system and its environment are constantly 
changing, and that complexity theory helps to explain the way that agents, systems and environments interact and 
produce change. Applying the concept of emergence to transitions in the rules underpinning infrastructure 
procurement then, requires the examination of the how the interaction between agents involved in individual 
projects, can influence the structural characteristics of the industry in which they are located.  
 
In order to explain this dynamic more fully, the paper reviews transition theory, and complex adaptive systems 
theory – particularly the concept of emergence. Interwoven with this analysis is an examination of the major 
transitions that occurred in the procurement rules in Australia, together with an outline of the impact that these 
arrangements have at an aggregate industry level. The utility of emergence as a construct, to understand changes 
that project governance arrangements can have at the industry level is then demonstrated through empirical 
research about the procurement of infrastructure.  
 
It is argued that changes to rules in procurement need to be carefully managed. This is because changes to the 
interaction rules are likely to result in changes to the nature of individual projects, which result over time to 
changes to the structure of industries, which may in turn increase risk to government, or otherwise affect 
procurement outcomes. It is contended here that the concept of emergence provides a useful construct to 
understand the dynamics and outcomes of procurement systems at the industry level.  
 
Complex Adaptive Systems 
Complex adaptive systems theory is derived chiefly from biology and seeks to understand the behaviour of 
populations of animals on given landscapes, with Kauffman (1995) and Holland (1998) key authors. Recently this 
theory has been incorporated into the strategic management literature, under the guise of organizational ecology 
(Hannan and Carroll 1992), and into the public policy literature (Klijn 2007). While there are many elements to the 
theory, the concept of emergence will be the focus here, due to the utility of the construct to managing transitions 
in infrastructure procurement.  
 
According to CAS theorists the structure of system results from the interaction of agents according to rules. In the 
case of procuring infrastructure, such „interaction rules‟ are governed by the policy arrangements of given 
government policy. The interaction of agents results in the emergence of order (Holland 1998) in the system as a 
whole. From this perspective, the interaction of agents in procurement projects according to rules will have an 
impact on the industry as a whole overtime.  
 
When we look at the behaviour of a complex system as a whole, our focus shifts from the individual element of the 
system to the complex structure of the system. The complexity emerges as a result of the patterns of interaction 
between the elements (Cilliers 1999, 5). Cillers (1999, 143) goes on to explain that this is not understood in a 
metaphysical sense, but rather that order emerges out of interaction according to rules (a process also know as 
self-organising), without the intervention of external forces. The emergence of higher order structure from 
interaction is one of the key properties of CAS (Holland 1995).  This notion of emergence is discussed in detail 
later, however a brief discussion of CAS and transitions is important first.    
Complex adaptive systems and transitions 
Loorbach and van Raak (2005) note that while complexity theory has considerable application for public policy 
research, the actual experience in policy settings is not one of gradual Darwinian evolution. Instead, transitions in 
policy arenas are often marked by short periods of quite radical change (punctuated equilibrium), followed by long 
periods of stability (Loorbach and van Raak 2005). Transitions are often marked by developments in a number of 
domains or arenas at the same time, which can either inhibit or accelerate change in other arenas (Martens and 
Rotmans 2005). Kemp and Rotmans (2001) define a transition as: 
 
 
A transition 
… is the shift from an initial dynamic equilibrium to a new dynamic equilibrium 
… is characterised by fast and slow developments as a result of interacting processes 
… involves innovation in an important part of a societal subsystem 
 
Like complex systems, transitions are viewed as a multilevel construct. At the macro level is the set of societal 
expectations, the meso level there are patterns of institutions, artifacts, rules and norms assembled and 
maintained to perform economic and social activities, and the micro level is the individual specific actors  (van der 
Brugge and Rotmans 2007).  
 
Figure 1 – Transitions as a multilevel phenomena (van der Brugge and Rotmans 2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A hallmark of systems is that there are multiple actors and levels of action within a system (Holland 1995). 
Hitchkins (2003, 80) argues that all systems are in fact comprised of subsystems so every system is a “system of 
systems”. Holland states this another way by noting there are multiple levels within systems (Holland 1998, 9) and 
higher order systems are built up from a combination of lower level systems (Holland 1995). While complex 
systems are made up of agents interacting according to rules, such interaction results in complex and emergent 
patterns, not all of which can be attributed to the action of any one actor or elements of the system (Holland 1995).  
 
In physics for example “after three hundred years of dissecting everything into molecules and atoms nuclei and 
quarks, [scientists] … were starting to look at how those pieces go together into complex wholes” (Waldrop 1992, 
16). Likewise in biology “where people had spent the last twenty years laying bare the molecular mechanisms of 
DNA, and proteins, and all the other components of the cell. Now they were also beginning to grapple with the 
essential mystery: how can several quadrillion such molecules organize themselves into an entity that moves, that 
responds, that reproduces, that is alive?” (Waldrop 1992, 16). Put simply, macro phenomena emerges out of micro 
actions (Tang and Youmin 2006).  
 
Insert Figure 2 – Transitions as a 
multilevel phenomena (van der 
Brugge and Rotmans 2007) 
 
van der Brugge and Rotmans (van der Brugge and Rotmans 2007) argue that regimes are complex adaptive 
systems: “an island of relative stability embedded in a changing landscape and not always capable of adapting 
due to its interdependencies between its actors and artifacts” (van der Brugge and Rotmans 2007). However, the 
multilevel nature of complex adaptive systems, would suggest that the interaction all these levels (micro, meso 
and macro) are part of the CAS not just the regimes level.  
 
According to transition theory though, transitional changes do not have a predetermined outcome, but instead 
have a variety of potential outcomes. The transition to stabilisation is “the desired pathway in achieving 
sustainable development. However, the complexity of the interaction processes limits control over societal 
developments which may lead to less desired pathways, such as the lock-in, the backlash or the system 
breakdown” (van der Brugge and Rotmans 2007). This can be seen in Figure 2 below. 
 
Figure 3 – Possible complex adaptive system pathways (van der Brugge and Rotmans 2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Putting together the notions of complex adaptive systems and transitions while rules are seen as key elements in 
complex adaptive systems, they are relatively under examined in transitions research. Additionally, the impact that 
making significant changes to the rules is unlikely to be able to be determined beforehand, with a number of 
possible outcomes from the changed in the rules.  
 
The goal of this paper is to make explicit the transitions in a particular public policy arena – procurement of 
engineering assets, by focussing on the rules, and how these rules transition over time, and the impact that these 
have on the system overall.  
Rules  
Within CAS theory, the behaviour of agents is seen to be determined by a collection of rules (Holland 1995). 
Understanding the rules of a CAS is vitally important as it is these rules which are held to determine agent 
behaviour. For leading CAS authors such as Gell-Mann (1994) it is precisely this capability of being able to create 
rules that distinguishes CAS from other complex systems such as galaxies.  The first step to understanding the 
dynamics of a system is to identify the rules which underpin how the system operates (Rhodes and MacKecknie 
2003).   
Rules in Public Management and Organisational Theory 1 
Like other elements of CAS theory, the notion of agent decision making based upon rules is not totally new to 
organisational studies or public management, as March and Simon have argued (1993, 8):  
 
The matching of rules to situations rests on the logic of appropriateness. Actions are chosen by 
recognizing a situation as being of a frequently encountered, type, and matching the recognized 
situation to a set of rules… The logic of appropriateness is linking to conceptions of experience, 
roles, intuition and expert knowledge. It deals with calculation mainly as a means of retrieving 
experience preserved in the organizations files or individuals memories. 
 
                                                 
1
 Parts of this section on rules were originally advanced in (Furneaux ,Brown and Gudmundsson 2008a) 
Figure 2  – possible complex adaptive 
systems pathways (van der Brugge 
and Rotmans 2007) 
 
That individuals use rules to make decisions is reflected in the notion that agents have frames of reference or 
schemata (Rhodes and MacKechnie 2003) by which they interpret and evaluate information (Kiljn and Teisman 
2007). These schemata include an understanding of how the world, people, organisations and procedures work 
(Wolf 2005, 187).  
 
Rules provide codes of meaning that facilitate the interpretation of ambiguous worlds. They 
embody collective and individual roles, identities, rights and obligations, interests, values 
worldviews, and memory, and thus constrain the allocation of attention, standards of evaluation, 
priorities, perceptions and resources (Olsen 2005, p.9).  
 
From a public policy perspective: 
 
making sense of contemporary public administration then, requires and understanding of the complex 
ecology of institutions, actors, rules, values, principles, goals, interests, beliefs, powers and cleavages in 
which it operates (Olsen 2005, p7). 
 
Holland (1995) contends that rules can be classified into two main types – rules which regulate the action of 
agents, and rules about the system itself. This point is echoed by Klijn (2001, 2007) suggesting that in public policy 
systems there are rules which focus on the policy arena itself (arena rules), and those which relate to the 
interaction of agents in a network (interaction rules). This can be demonstrated in the following table:  
 
Table 1  – Types of rules in a procurement system (adapted from Klijn (2001)) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Since the state is the agency through which the "rules of the game" are established and enforced, the state 
controls to an important extent the institutional environment by determining how agents interact (Vanberg and 
Buchanan 1986, 217-218). As has been suggested in the introduction, by changing the interaction rules, 
government can change the dynamics of the system.  
Rules and the challenge of engineering asset procurement 
While it may well be true that rules are an important element of a CAS (Holland 1995), and these rules can be 
categorised into interaction rules and system rules (Klijn 2001), the specifics of these rules need to be outlined for 
procurement of infrastructure.  
 
Applying the notion of rules in procurement then requires an investigation of the rules about the procurement 
system and the rules of interaction within the system. There are a large number of decisions which need to be 
made in any procurement activity. Two key sets of rules relate to decisions concerning the institutional 
arrangements (interaction rules) involved in delivering the engineering asset, and in decisions concerning the 
project or asset itself (system rules).  
 
Research Question 1: What are the interaction rules for procuring engineering assets? 
Insert Table 1 rules in a procurement 
system (adapted from Klijn (2001)) 
 
 
 
The following section reviews the interaction rules and system rules of procurement systems.  As will be shown, 
these rules have changed over time with consequences for the market as a whole.  
 
Interaction Rules  
 The structure of agents interacting in governmental arenas has been of growing concern to public policy 
researchers – particularly those researching the various modes of governance: hierarchy, network and market 
(Keast ,Mandell and Brown 2006). Boisot and Child (1999) argue that these different organising arrangements are 
the main mechanisms2 by which agents in CAS cope with complexity. After many years of research and 
theorising, markets, hierarchies and networks have been accepted as the fundamental different modes of 
interaction between organisations (Rhodes and MacKechnie 2003). Hierarchy involves the establishment of 
vertical chains of accountability, and is primarily focussed on control; markets involve the exchange or barter of 
goods and services, with competition a key logic; and networks involve various types of negotiated outcomes, with 
collaboration a key logic . Keast, Mandell and Brown (2006) argue that these arrangements are archetypes and in 
realty a mix of the three modes of governance is typical in a given set of arrangements, and provide a useful 
overview of these different modes of governance. 
 
Table 2 – Summary of forms of organisational interaction (Adapted from Keast ,Mandell and Brown 2006)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
The interaction between the formal (hierarchy) and informal (network) systems produces emergent order, which 
may or may not be in line with the intentions of those in authority (Smith and Stacey 1997). As Meek et al. (2007, 
p.24) have argued “administrative networks, shared governance, and co-production of public services developed 
in the conjunctive state, are real-world examples of the emergent properties of complex adaptive systems”.    
 
While the notion of networks, markets and hierarchies, as modes of governance, is not new (Polyani 1957; 
Rhodes 1997), recent work has focused on the optimal mix of modes of governance in order to deliver services 
and products (Provan and Kenis 2007), and the importance of different types of networks for different situations 
(Keast ,Brown and Mandell 2007; Provan and Kenis 2008).  As has been argued here, these archetypal forms 
provide fruitful ways of examining interaction in procurement systems.  
 
Rather than arguing about the structure of the interaction (i.e. is it a market, a network or a hybrid), the focus here 
is on the rules which underpin the resulting structure – what Keast et.al (2006) term the core dimension of the 
organizational interaction. These dimensions, or rules as they are termed here, are discussed in detail below.  
 
Competition – working against: Markets rely on competition (typically through competitive tendering) and legal 
contracts to moderate interactions between organisations (Keast ,Mandell and Brown 2006). Competitive 
tendering minimises costs by using market pressures to encourage contractors to lower their prices. Competitive 
tendering has been the primary approach to procurement, particularly in infrastructure projects (Masterman 1992). 
Even when collaborative approaches are eventually undertaken, this does not preclude competition completely 
from the procurement system. Competitive tendering and competition between objectives, technologies and ideas 
                                                 
2 Boisot and Child (1999) use the terms fief and clan in stead of the term networks. The term network has been retained as it is the term 
commonly used in a range of literatures (e.g. Rhodes 1997; Keast, Brown and Mandel 2006).  
Insert Table 2 - Summary of forms of organisational interaction 
(Adapted from Keast ,Mandell and Brown 2006) 
are all possible within a collaborative project. Presence or absence of competition, is not the point, but rather how 
competition is managed in the procurement process.  
 
Collaboration – working with: Two main forms of construction relationships exist, which the client determines by 
the manner in which they approach the market: a low trust competitive route, and high trust cooperative route 
(Akintoye ,McIntosh and Fitzgerald 2000; Saad ,Jones and James 2002). Cooperation and trust is difficult to 
achieve between firms involved in procurement, even though beneficial (Teece 1992, cited in Eriksson 2008). 
Finding the right balance between competition and cooperation is a  challenge for clients procuring engineering 
assets (Eriksson 2008). 
 
Table 3 – Competition and Cooperation in Procurement phases (based on Eriksson (2008))  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While cooperative based approaches to procurement may be understood as important and desirable by clients, 
Eriksson (2008) found that they did not understand how procurement affected cooperative and competitive 
behaviour.  While Thompson and Sanders (1998)  argue that competition and collaboration are dependant on the 
degree of alignment of objectives, other researchers have argued that the alignment of objectives is highly unlikely 
to occur. Instead, the extent of collaboration and competition is a function of the procurement system chosen 
(Ross and Robertson 2007).  
 
Control – working for: Hierarchies regulate behaviour through various overt control mechanisms (Lædre et al. 
2006). Due to the view of procurement as autonomous organisations working together, the notion of control is 
lacking in some of the procurement literature. For government procurement, the issue of accountability is very 
salient as governments agencies are accountable to their ministers, to parliament and ultimately to the public for 
the outcomes of procurement processes. As Olsen (2005, 18) notes: “Bureaucracy is part of a repertoire of 
overlapping, supplementary, and competing forms coexisting in modern democracies, together with market 
organisation and network organisation”. Control is often demonstrated in the form of contract. Alliance type 
contracts have lower levels of control, than say fixed price contracts.  Like competition and collaboration, the issue 
is not about the present or absence of control, but how control is achieved in the procurement system. 
 
Control, collaboration, and Competition as Dimensions of Project Governance 
No single procurement system follows a pure form of project governance (following Keast et al. (2006)) but rather 
there is a mix of these dimensions of governance in any given project. Managing these dimensions determines the 
appropriate form of project governance.  Market, hierarchy and network are different mechanisms for achieving 
rationality, accountability, and control, mobilising resources, and organising feedback and it is highly unlikely that 
public administration can be organised on the basis of a single mechanism alone (Olsen 2005?). Klijn and 
Koppenjan (2006) maintain that rules are a particularly useful way of exploring network outcomes as: “institutions 
 Insert Table 3  
 
Competition and Cooperation in Procurement phases (based on 
Eriksson (2008)) 
are therefore in short sets of rules, which influence, guide and limit the behaviour of actions, In this sense 
networks can be regarded as institutions. They are patterns of social relationships between mutually dependant 
actors“. Consequently the following diagram is advanced, as a way of examining the „mix‟ or dimensions of various 
governance modes.  
 
Figure 4 - Dimensions of project governance mechanisms (Furneaux ,Brown and Gudmundsson 2008a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Under this conceptualisation, the mix of competition, control and collaboration can be seen as the degree towards 
one of the three dimensions. While theoretically possible to have a relationship between organisations which are 
highly competitive, controlling and collaborative, this is highly unlikely. CAS theory (Kauffman 1993) would argue, 
there is a trade off between various options. For example, an animal that gains increased stamina and endurance, 
does so at the expense of speed.  For organisations then, as interaction arrangements move towards 
collaboration, they are likely to move away from control and competition. Likewise, as arrangements move towards 
control they move away from collaboration, and competition.  For procurement arrangements, this would seem to 
hold. For example, construction relationships can be characterised as either a low trust competitive route, or a 
high trust cooperative route (Korczynski 1996). These alternative modes of governing relationships involved in the 
delivery of services can influence the outcome of the network (Klijn and Koppenjan 2006), a point agreed to by 
proponents of CAS theory (Rhodes and MacKechnie 2003).  
 
Table 4 - Summary of governance rules and their affect on individual projects (Adapted and extended from Eriksson 2008; 
Rowlinson 1999; Boisot and Child 1999)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Practical application to procurement of infrastructure 
 
Before NPM, procurement was delivered predominantly by in house labour, with large and complex projects being 
outsourced (Furneaux and Brown 2007). Following widespread adoption of NPM in Australia, this resulted in a 
significant shift to contracting out of construction services – the competitive model.  
 
Competitive Construction Procurement Systems   
Insert figure 3 project governance 
mechanisms from Furneaux, 2008 
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Summary of governance rules and 
their affect on individual projects 
(Adapted and extended from Eriksson 
2008; Rowlinson 1999; Boisot and 
Child 1999)   
For construction projects, the traditional approach to building procurement involved the compulsory competitive 
tendering of each stage of the construction process in an effort to reduce costs. Figure 4 summarises the typical 
relationships in a traditional construction contracts. As this figure demonstrated, there is little or no interaction 
between the designer and the builder of the project under such arrangements.  
 
Figure 5 – Traditional Approaches to procurement  
  
 
        Legend 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissatisfaction with traditional approaches led to experimentation with other forms of contract delivery 
mechanisms – or procurement systems as they became termed.  
 
Collaborative approaches to procurement systems  
Public management theorists note that collaboration, evidenced in “networks and network behaviour were 
unintended consequences of marketisation. Institutional differentiation whether by contracting-out, public private 
partnerships or bypassing local government for special purpose bodies creates imperatives for interdependent 
actors to work together” (Rhodes 1997, 48).   
 
Most recently, alliance forms of contractual relationships have become popular, as outlined in Figure 2. A key 
distinction between this approach and traditional approaches, is that all the members of the construction team are 
involved in the planning of the project.  The involvement of constructors in the design phase of the project, can 
provide important early advice on the „buildability‟ of a given design, and thus reduce changes to plans and 
contracts, and therefore costs and time overruns. Additionally, the establishment of the alliance may be through 
open tender, the pre-qualified supplier arrangements, or through bids by invitation – which together involve is a 
less competitive approach than compulsory competitive tendering.  
 
Figure 6 - Alliance approaches 
 
Legend 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – traditional approaches to 
procurement  
Figure 5 – alliance approaches to 
procurement  
 
In summary, these two approaches sit at opposite ends of the institutional engagement of agents in procurement 
systems. Table 5 summarises these contrasts:  
 
 
Table 5 - Comparison of traditional and alliance forms of contracts 
Procurement system  Traditional Alliance 
Level of competition initially Typically high  Low to Medium (depends) 
Level of collaboration once 
the contracts are awarded 
Low High  
 
Thus there have been distinct changes to the way in which procurement has been affected in Australia in recent 
years – from a controlling approach   
 
Having reviewed the literature on complex adaptive systems and transitions, it should be evident that changing the 
rules of the system can affect the system in significant, and sometimes unforeseen ways. The following section 
discusses the impact of the shift from traditional to competitive mode of interaction and the likely affect this may 
have on the system over all.  
 
 
Potential for aggregate affects of procurement rules  
Historically, the construction industry in Australia and the UK are considered highly fragmented, or loosely couple 
industries, often characterized by extensive litigation and dispute resolution costs. Recently, authors have laid the 
cause of this fragmentation squarely at the feet of the traditional procurement process.  
 
Consider Figure 1 again – each agent in the system is disconnected to each other, and each stage of the process 
is subjected to compulsory competitive arrangements. In other words, the traditional project delivery system is a 
highly competitive process, and even once contracts have been awarded, the work is „thrown over the fence‟ to 
the next professional with little or no interaction on specific projects. Contract by contract, day by day, competition 
prohibited collaboration between firms who provided the same services. Within projects themselves, there is little 
or no communication between professionals as each was responsible for different elements of the project. Over 
decades such fragmented procurement systems are likely to have an affect on the industry, and indeed authors 
have recently argued that the causes of the fragmentation at the market level are directly as a result of 
procurement policies.  
 
As noted earlier, new more collaborative forms of procurement arrangements are beginning to become 
increasingly popular. Such fundamental shifts from competitive to more collaborative approaches to project 
governance can be viewed as a major transition in procurement system arrangements. In many ways such 
changes mirror the shift from NPM towards more collaborative approaches to governance in public policy more 
generally. However, just as traditional forms of procurement resulted in unexpected outcomes for the industry, so 
to the change to more collaborative forms of procurement is unlikely to be a pure panacea, and may well have 
unintended consequences. Managing the transition to these more collaborative approaches then, needs to be 
carefully managed. It is here that the concept of emergence provides a useful construct to understand the 
dynamics and outcomes of procurement systems at the level of organizational field or industry level.  
  
Emergence in Public Management and Strategic Management literature  
Adaptation in CAS occurs due to changes in the environment, the choices of agents and often a dynamic feedback 
between these two. When the environment of the system changes, so does the behavior of it agents and as a 
result, the behavior of the system as a whole – in other words – the system learns and adapts to the new 
environment (Lewin and Regine 2003). CAS also evolves over time through the entry, exit, and change of agents, 
as well as changes in the linkages between agents (Anderson 1999). The structure and dynamics of a CAS are a 
result of choices by the agents, as they learn and adapt to actions of other agents (March and Olsen 1984).   
 
That a complex process can be self-organising is not new in and of itself. Adam Smith (1971) introduced the 
notion of the „invisible hand of capitalism‟ where markets were efficient yet were governed by laws of supply and 
demand, not government. What is relatively new is the application of this concept to management (Clippinger 
1999, 2). Notions of self-organisation have parallels in institutional theory with its idea that structures emerge from 
interaction of agents, as they interpret and use institutional rules (Teisman and Klijn 2008). CAS models are 
inherently multi-level as the order is seen as an emergent property which results from lower levels of aggregate 
behaviour (Anderson 1999).     
 
Daneke (2005, 95) argues that “the primary feature of social systems thinking is its focus on those elements that 
„emerge‟ from the interactions of agents and institutions”. The structure and dynamics of a CAS are a result of 
choices by the agents, as they learn and adapt to actions of other agents (Cilliers 1999, 90). In other words there 
is no formal order imposed from outside of the CAS, and order emerges from the interactions between the agents 
at a local level (Stacey and Griffin 2005, 7). “Emergence is the term used in CAS theory to describe the 
phenomena of patterns at a higher level of abstraction that arise from interactions among lower level agents” 
(Rhodes and MacKechnie 2003, 63).  
 
The capacity for self-organisation is a property of complex systems which enables them to develop or 
change internal structure spontaneously and adaptively in order to cope with, or manipulate, their 
environment (Xi and Tang 2006, 189) 
 
Smith and Stacey (1997), in their review of complexity and public policy research, argue that focussing on the 
optimal mix of network, hierarchy and market governance modes in specific situations, can overlook the fact that 
such arrangements will not remain stable but will adapt and evolve and tensions between mixed governance 
modes will generate new forms of organisation. As Meek et al. (2007, p.24) argues “administrative networks, 
shared governance, and co-production of public services are real-world examples of the emergent properties of 
complex adaptive systems”. Klijn and Teisman (2007) agree, noting that both the governance system and its 
environment are constantly changing, and that complexity theory helps to explain the way that agents, systems 
and environments interact and produce change. CAS theory holds that such interaction produces change not just 
within a network, but how multiple interactions between agents produce an outcome at an aggregate level (Dubois 
and Gadde 2002, 630). It is this area of evolution, emergence and adaptation which CAS theory is held to provide 
a powerful extension to the advances made by network governance (White 2001). 
 
Emergence and the challenge of engineering asset procurement 
While various studies have discussed the structure of industries (Rosenkopf and Schilling 2007) this study extends 
previous work by positing that the interaction between firms involved in procurement activities has an effect on the 
structure of populations of organisations. Posed in CAS terminology; interaction between actors involved in 
procurement activities results in the emergence of structure at the population level. Posed as a research question: 
 
 
 
 
 
Research Question 2: How has the interaction of agents according to rules in procurement systems 
resulted in the emergence of aggregate order in the system?  
Rosenkopf and Schilling (2007) examined the network structure of 32 industries in the USA. In their work 
industries could be categorised into different types of networks, based upon the network structure. Some networks 
were disconnected with very low connectivity and small size; a second type of network, termed hybrid, had 
medium levels of density with clusters of nodes identifiable; and finally spiderwebs are defined by their high 
network connectivity and large size (Rosenkopf and Schilling 2007). Rosenkopf and Schilling (2007) thus 
demonstrate that industries have different network structures, although they have not established the causes of 
these differences.  
 
Unfortunately, longitudinal data concerning industry structure, its change over time, and causal correlation 
statistics is not currently available to answer this research question. However, evidence does exist which lends 
support to the argument developed in this paper and researchers have begun to argue that procurement can have 
a positive or negative effect on collaboration at an industry level (Eriksson 2008; Eriksson and Pesämaa 2007).   
 
An example of the emergence of aggregate order from micro interactions can be seen from the construction 
industry in Australia. The various phases outlined below relate to the changes to the rules of procurement.  
 
Phase 1 – Contracting out 
Following the widespread implementation of contracting out in Australia, much contracting of construction work by 
government was awarded on the basis of lowest price which was achieved through competitive tendering of each 
stage of the construction project (design, construction, maintenance). In terms outlined in the sections above, the 
procurement rules were based on lowest price (cost criteria) and the interaction rules were primarily based on 
competition (in order to achieve lowest price). According to Masterman (1992) this pursuit of lowest costs, via 
highly competition was the predominant method of procurement for most of the 20th century. In their review of the 
structure of the construction industry, Dubois and Gadde (2002) found that the industry is highly fragmented, and 
that this fragmentation is the result of the highly competitive nature typical of procurement approaches. In order 
words the high competition, lowest price procurement route resulted in fragmentation and litigation at an industry 
level.  
 
Phase 2 – Increased collaboration and increased requirements  
The fragmentation and dissatisfaction with outcomes in competitive procurement coincided with changes to the 
rules under which contracts were undertaken with a move to an increased collaborative approach to procurement. 
At the same time, government began to introduce a number of additional requirements to procurement contracts, 
in order to achieve multiple policy outcomes. These outcomes included policies such as training, public art, and 
regional development (Austen et al. 2007), as well as OH&S compliance systems (Brown ,Furneaux and Allan 
2008).   
 
A practical outcome of the shift to more collaborative forms of contracting and increasing the requirements 
contractors where required to deliver in addition to the building, has been a reduction in the number of bids 
received to undertake construction work in Australia (Austen et al. 2007). These additional requirements, together 
with initiatives in prequalification activities are likely to have contributed to a reduction in the number of suppliers. 
Consider Table 6 which shows this reduction in numbers dramatically:  
 
Table 6 – Reduction in the Number of Bids for Construction (Austen et al. 2007, 62)  
Prequalification Financial Level Amount Decline in average # of tender bids 
Level 0 $1 to$149,000 22.90% 
Level 1 $150,000 to $750,000 50.20% 
Level 2 $750,001 to $1,500,000 56.40% 
Level 3 $1,500,001 to $3,000,000 60.40% 
Level 4 $3,000,001 to $7,500,000 56.40% 
Level 5 $7,500,001 and above 26.20% 
 
 
 
Phase 3 – Managing markets?   
In previous research undertaken by the authors, the idea that procurement practices had an effect on markets was 
noted (Furneaux and Brown 2007). A reduction in the number of suppliers has a significant consequence for costs 
in procurement.   
 
The increasing reliance of government on a limited number of suppliers increases the potential for opportunism in 
bidding increases significantly, due to low contestability (Globerman and Vining 1996). Anecdotally, this appears to 
already happening in Australia, with significant increases in infrastructure costs due to the high demand for 
construction services and the relatively low pool of available workers and construction firms with capability to 
undertake the work.  
 
However there is another more indirect affect of increasing collaboration with fewer suppliers. If the emergent 
outcome of agents interacting in a highly competitive and non collaboration manner is a highly fragmented 
industry, then is seems logical that the outcome of low up front competition and high collaboration during a project 
is a more tightly coupled industry. While a loosely coupled industry presents distinct challenges, a tightly coupled 
one presents a rather different set of challenges.  
 
In loosely coupled systems, change is difficult to effect, due to the lack of connectivity between agents. In tightly 
coupled systems, change can be difficult to effect due to „lock in‟ effects of strong relationships, which resist 
change. While loosely coupled systems might be high in diversity and result in a lack of consistency, tightly 
coupled systems might be characterized with strong institutional isomorphism, as Di Maggio and Powell (1983) 
famously argued, with little diversity.  
  
While there are a number of difficulties with the rigidity of tightly coupled systems, the largest issue of concern is 
the possibility of a shock moving through the whole system, as occurred recently in the banking industry. A tightly 
coupled banking industry enables the rapid transfer of money through time and space. However, it also enables 
shocks to rapidly move through the banking system worldwide due to its highly interconnected nature. The 
transition from a loosely coupled system to a more tightly coupled system is a transition process which needs to 
be managed as there is potential for significant negative outcomes if a major player failed. Thus a both a tightly 
coupled system and a loosely coupled system both have disadvantages, and an industry comprised of a mix of 
strong and weak ties (one which is neither tightly coupled, nor loosely coupled) appears to offer the best solution – 
as Rhodes (1997) put it – it is the mix that matters.   
 
A summary of the changes to the rules of the system, the immediate effect on project and the longer term impact 
on the market is noted in Figure 6 below.  
 
Figure 7 – Affect of changes to rules on projects and market  
 
Changes to the rules Affect on projects Aggregate affect on the market over 
time 
   
In house delivery of public 
works 
Major contracts only put to market Separation of public and private 
 
   
 
Shift to market based 
delivery of public works 
(NPM) 
 
 
Lowest price pursued 
 
Compulsory competitive tendering 
Increase in number of suppliers 
bidding for government contracts 
   
 
Introduction of a number of 
additional outcomes and 
performance criteria which 
became delivered through 
procurement 
 
 
Increased requirements on what is 
expected from public works contracts 
(e.g. apprenticeship completions, 
OH&S) 
 
 
Reduction in suppliers bidding for 
government contracts 
   
 
Shift to best value in 
procurement 
 
Reduction in suppliers results in 
shift to more collaborative 
approaches to procurement 
Need to manage the  market and 
relationships 
 
Thus, interaction between agents according to rules results in the emergence of industry structures. This can be 
demonstrated in the following diagram (Figure 6):   
 
Figure 8 – Emergence of Industry characteristics as a result of interaction rules adapted from (Furneaux ,Brown and 
Gudmundsson 2008b) .  
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Conclusion  
  
The conceptualization advanced in this paper helps in considering the management of transitions, as it draws 
attention to the emergent effects of agent interactions according to rules. In order to manage the emergent effects 
of transitions in the interaction rules, the consequences of such changes will need to be monitored, and the 
resulting structure of the industry assessed.  
 
Consequently, complexity theory in particular the concept of emergence, provides a highly useful construct to 
understand the dynamics of procurement systems, and industries as a whole. Together emergence and transition 
theory draws our attention to some the likely dynamics which occur as a result of public policy changes.  
 
Further empirical work would elicit a number of additional changes to rules, and increase the depth and breadth of 
analysis advanced here.  
 
However, this paper has already contributed to theoretical understanding by drawing attention to the dynamics that 
can emerge in procurement systems, particularly when changes are made to the rules underpinning key activities 
in the system.  
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